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Synopses 185EVALUATION OF BASEL III REVISION OF QUANTITATIVE STANDARDS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNAL MODELS FOR
MARKET RISKMeera SHARMAThis paper studies the impact of the revision
by the Basel Committee in 2011 of one of the
quantitative standards for internal models of
market risk. The revision allows calculation
of the Value-at-Risk (VaR) using a weighting
scheme on historical data (or data lengths
less than a year) as long as the resultant
capital charge is at least as conservative as
that using un-weighted data. This study
applies the historical simulation method to
calculate VaR for ten year long daily returns
data of Indian stocks and the INR/USD
exchange rate.Data lengths of 1000, 750, 500
and 250 days are used in combination withdata lengths of 190 and 125 days to evaluate
impact of the revision. The VaRs generated
by each data length individually and by the
combinations of long and short data lengths
are evaluated using four tests, namely the
regulatory back test; and hypotheses tests of
unconditional coverage, independence, and
conditional coverage of VaR exceptions.
The combination of short and long historical
observation periods improves the
performance of long period VaRs in
regulatory back tests, resulting in lower
regulatory penalties in both data series. The
combination also improves performance inhypothesis tests of unconditional coverage.
The inability of historical simulation, using
both long and short data lengths, to deal
with exception clustering is highlighted by
their failure of tests of independence. All
the VaR methods, taken individually and in
combination, fail the test of conditional
coverage in case of the equity data.
However, the combinations between 1000
and 750 VaRs and 190 and 125 day VaRs pass
the test of conditional coverage in case of
forex rate data, showing some potential in
combination VaRs to deal with exception
clustering.INTERVIEW
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE INDIAN INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: EMERGING MECHANISMS AND CHALLENGES
In conversation with K V Kamath, Chairman, Infosys and ICICI Bank
N. BALASUBRAMANIAN and Rejie GEORGEEven as the power and influence of
corporations are indisputably acknowledged
in modern society, there is a concomitant
need to govern them such that the
competing and often conflicting interests of
the state, society, and the shareholders are
reconciled and aligned. Over the years,
several corporate governance mechanisms
have evolved to cater to these governance
challenges. N Balasubramanian and Rejie
George set out some of the key internal
mechanisms of corporate governance and
their institutional context, and examine
how corporate boards as a preeminentmechanism of such governance are
structured to perform their assigned role.
Section A charts out the broad corporate
governance landscape, emphasising the
internal governance mechanisms such as the
board of directors, large shareholders and
debt holders, and executive compensation
schemes. Section B focuses on boards and
emphasises the scenario in India. It takes up
issues relating to (a) optimal board size; (b)
the proportion of non-executive and
executive directors in the interests of
objectivity and impartiality; (c) board
profile and diversity to ensure the rightbalance of domain skills and breadth of
experience and exposure of value to the
company; (d) the “duality debate” on the
separation of board chair and chief
executive positions; (e) interlocking
directorships, and (f) parent-subsidiary
relationships, especially where the interests
of subsidiaries and their affiliates may not
coincide with the parent’s. Section C
documents the authors’ conversation with
Mr K V Kamath, non-executive chairman of
the boards of Infosys and ICICI Bank, two of
India’s top ranking corporations, discussing
many of the issues raised.
